Madunagu: Further notes on political alliances

THIS is a review, and an update, of my Notes on geopolitical alliances, which appeared in this column on Thursday, August 18, 2005.  That piece was inspired by the well-publicised and orchestrated alliance talks ahead of the 2007 general elections in Nigeria.  In a similar manner the present piece was instigated, so to say, by what is now going on – ahead of the 2015 elections, or rather, anticipated 2015 elections. Since access to the 2005 article may not be easy for every reader, I think I should begin this review and update with a summary of the key points of the original discussion to which the present one is a sequel.

In the 2005 Notes on geopolitical alliances, I said that “these realignments, as some journalists call them, are mainly, but not exclusively, between geo-political fractions of the ruling blocs and satellite political forces aspiring to move nearer to the centre of political power”.  Although this general description is still valid, it can benefit, in clarity, from appreciation of the political developments in the country since 2005 – particularly the development of the two power blocs and the two main opposition parties in the country:  the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Congress of Progressive Change (CPC).  For instance, when we say “opposition parties” we must not forget that ACN and CPC are not “underdogs” in all parts of the country.  They are very strong parties in large segments of the country. Beyond that they are the leading mainstream constitutional political forces in (national) opposition to the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and to Federal Government, which the party controls.

In the 2005 article, I said: “Historically, geopolitical alliances in Nigeria have been of three types.  Call them A, B and C. Under Type A are alliances between non-ruling political parties, which recognise their respective strengths – mainly electoral – in different parts of the country and therefore hope that by coming together they will be able to command an electoral majority in the country, and thus displace the ruling party”. I would, today, add that it is not all the parties involved in current alliance talks – openly or secretly – that are informed and directed by this broad strategy. Some of the smaller parties in alliance talks are primarily concerned with remaining alive – by “linking up” – in face of PDP’s pressure.

For similar reasons of survival, some small parties, which were former factions of PDP may now be moving back to their original home. It is also true that this “life-saving” strategy informed several political alliances from the years preceding Nigeria’s independence in 1960, up to the coup of January 1966 and in the Second Republic (1979 - 1983).

Under Type B “are alliances between regional, zonal or ethnic segments of the (national) ruling party. Confident that their party will remain the ruling party, these segments then aspire to strengthen their positions or “bargaining power” in the party by coming together. The alliances are targeted at the hegemonic segment or segments of the party. The message to the hegemonic segment is: “If you refuse to recognise our combined strength and yield to our common demands, then we shall move to an opposition party or form a new party”. What can be added here, in view of the current level of bitterness within and outside mainstream politics, and indications that this tendency will continue to rise, is that the strategy of the “internal” opposition may now include to seize power by any means possible, or to make the country “ungovernable”.

Under Type C “are alliances between the ruling party and one or more non-ruling parties, and this happens when the ruling party is not so sure of remaining the ruling party if it does not go into such alliances”. This 2005 analysis remains largely valid today. But I would like to correct a particular impression that can be created by it. That analysis would seem to suggest that the terms of an alliance (attempted or consummated) were based only on the relative ‘electoral’ strengths of the parties involved. That impression is not correct, or rather, no longer correct. Relative extra-electoral strengths would now enter into calculation. And by extra –electoral strengths I mean forces that can be mobilised and deployed, not to the voting booths, but in the streets and in the media, or simply inspired, to oppose or support an electoral verdict or anticipated verdict. If, in the period up to 2005, this factor was not significant, and not consciously and deliberately put into calculation, it will be so in the coming electoral contest.

The preceding point can be made stronger. In the alliances currently being negotiated and others that will be negotiated in the period between now and the 2015 general elections, the ability to mobilise and deploy or inspire “political troops” or “political enforcers” or “militants” will come into serious calculation. I say this, first, in view of the current political trends in the country, particularly the increasingly militarised language of political disputation and, secondly, against the background of last year’s post-election violence.

As I said earlier, I still endorse my 2005 analysis of political alliances – when account is taken of the clarification (and update) sketched above. But a different picture is obtained if we separate alliances entered into, or attempted, ahead of a general election from alliances entered into, or attempted, after the election. The difference between the two sets of alliances is that in the alliances before a general election, the objective is to win the election, or to shift the balance of (political) forces in the country, whereas in the alliances after a general election the objective, for the “winner,” is to strengthen the ability to rule – preferably, with ineffective opposition. For the “loser”, the objective of post-election alliance is to strengthen the opposition and its “bargaining power” with the government and, as a long-term objective, to prepare for the next election.

We can see that integrating the two analyses – the one of 2005 and the one just sketched – gives a fuller historical picture of political alliances in Nigeria. We then have a composite alliance map in which the division of alliances into pre-election and post-election types is superimposed on types A, B, and C alliances. Another type of differentiation may, however, be produced if we introduce ideology, that is, the question of ideological orientations of the political parties involved in an alliance or alliance negotiation. The concrete question would be:  Are the parties in alliance ideologically compatible?

Before I say anything else, I must enter a caveat. Many people, including myself, have argued that there is no fundamental difference between the leading mainstream constitutional parties in existence in Nigeria today. For instance, all these parties, without exception, endorse and uphold the  neoliberal capitalist economic ideology and its twin – partner, the need for large and  heavily “moneyed” political parties and practices, where  politics now  obey the laws of the market (market forces).  However, even if we say that there is no fundamental difference between Party A and Party B, there will still be differences between them that are not fundamental.  Or else, A and B would be identical and we would not be talking of two parties, but one, and our entire analysis would collapse.

Although we may then say that, historically, two types of alliances have existed in Nigeria – alliances between parties that have no fundamental differences (although they may have differences that are not fundamental) and alliances between parties that have fundamental differences we must hasten to add that in mot cases what drives alliance-seekers is not ideological compatibility, but survival, and then, distribution of proceeds of power.

Political alliances are at different levels: local, regional and national. At each level an alliance may be between parties or between individual candidates, or both. To throw more light on this differentiation, I will simply remind readers that a legally nominated candidate may not be supported or fully supported by his or her party leadership. In this case of betrayal of a candidate by his or her party leadership, the candidate resorts to self-help and local “arrangement” to win the election.  Betrayal may also happen in the opposite direction, that is, a candidate betraying his or her party by supporting the opposing candidate and helping him or her to win.  We are also aware of instances where alliances constructed nationally are rejected or betrayed or frustrated at the regional or local levels.

Every local “arrangement” or “agreement” is affected, not freely, but with heavy dosages of money – in the appropriate currencies. All these, complexities are introduced here for the sake of analytical completeness. Our focus in the present discussion is on alliances between political parties, and at the national level.